O livro "Toleration in Clonflict: Past and Present" de Reiner Forst (Goethe University) foi resenhado na Notre Dame Philosophical Review. Traduzido do alemão, o livro conta com duas partes: uma história do conceito ("passado") e a proposta de um teoria da tolerância para as democracias contemporâneas ("presente"). Vale lembrar que Forst escreveu o verbete "Toleration" para a Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy no qual ele discute em linhas gerais as tipologias usadas no livro.
- Forst: "Toleration" [SEP]
Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present
Rainer Forst, Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present, Ciaran Croni (tr.), Cambridge University Press, 2013, 635pp., $110.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780521885775.
by John Horton (Keele University)
Rainer Forst is one of the outstanding political philosophers of his generation, and Toleration in Conflict is simply the most impressive philosophical work specifically on toleration that I have ever read (and over the years I have read rather a lot of such books). It is an immensely long and thorough work, and it is hard to resist a smile when reading in the Preface that it is actually an abridged version of the German edition, originally over 800 pages, although Forst generously reassures us that the English-language edition 'contains everything essential' (p. xiii). One reason for this length is that it is almost two books in one. (Given the cost, though, I resist any tendency to write "two books for the price of one".) About three quarters of the text consists of a history of toleration in Western thought (and to some extent practice) from antiquity to the twentieth century, while in the last quarter of the book Forst develops his own theory of toleration. There is also a forty-four page bibliography and an exemplary index. The original German edition was published ten years ago, and (entirely reasonably) there has been no attempt to update it, so more recent work has not therefore been addressed; for example, Wendy Brown's tirade against toleration. The translator, Ciaran Cronin, has worked closely with Forst, whose own English is in my experience exemplary, and the result is an English-language text that reads both fluently and idiomatically, the very occasional 'Germanicism' aside.
Although I have described it as almost two books in one, it would be misleading if this gave the impression of any disconnect between the parts. While each probably could just about be read independently of the other, a good deal would be lost in so doing. The historical story is informed by the theory of toleration of the second part, which is in turn largely reconstructed from the historical analysis of the first part. Thus the book opens with a discussion of the concept of toleration and various ideas (conceptions) of how that concept can be interpreted, including a consideration of the so-called 'paradoxes' of toleration. The structure of the concept as Forst sets it out is clear and compelling, and is likely to elicit only minor disagreements at most. However, considerably more distinctive and original is his identification of four principal conceptions of toleration: the permission conception, the coexistence conception, the respect conception (which admits of two forms -- formal equality and qualitative equality) and the esteem conception.
The permission conception, which for much of the history of the theory and practice of toleration has been its dominant form and probably remains the most common understanding of it,
designates the relation between an authority or a majority and a minority (or several minorities) which does not subscribe to the dominant system of values. Toleration here means that the authority (or majority) grants the minority the permission to live in accordance with its convictions so long as it -- and this is the crucial condition -- does not question the predominance of the authority (or majority). (p. 27)
The coexistence conception can be understood as an adaptation of the permission conception in circumstances where there is no longer a single dominant group but, instead, 'groups of approximately equal strengths who recognise that they must practise tolerance for the sake of social peace and in their own interests' (p. 28). On this conception the 'toleration relation is thus no longer a vertical one, as in the permission conception, but a horizontal one: those who exercise tolerance are at the same time also tolerated' (pp. 28-9). (Generally, the distinction between horizontal and vertical forms of toleration, roughly those exercised by dominant powers and by fellow citizens, respectively, has an important role in Forst's analysis.) However, what is fundamental is that neither the permission nor the coexistence conceptions 'lead to a form of mutual recognition which goes beyond the sufferance of others and rests on farther-reaching moral or ethical considerations' (p. 29).
The respect conception of toleration, by contrast, does just that: it 'proceeds from a morally grounded form of mutual respect on the part of the individuals or groups who exercise toleration. The tolerating parties respect one another as autonomous persons or as equally entitled members of a political community constituted under the rule of law' (p. 29). Ultimately, the respect conception is grounded in an acceptance of 'the right to justification', which requires collective norms to be reciprocally and generally valid. As this is the conception of toleration to which Forst wishes to give primacy, I shall have more to say about it later. However, it is worth remarking here that it can take one of two forms: formal equality or qualitative equality. 'The former assumes a strict separation between the private and public domains according to which ethical differences between citizens should be confined to the private domain and must not lead to conflicts within the public political sphere' (p. 30). Qualitative equality, on the other hand, is more accommodating of the public political expression of ethical and cultural identities, and 'implies recognising the claim of others to full membership in the political community without demanding that in the process they must renounce their ethical-cultural identity in ways that cannot be reciprocally required' (p. 31). The final conception of toleration, the esteem conception,
involves a more demanding form of mutual recognition than the respect conception, for, according to it, toleration means not only respecting the members of other cultural or religious communities as legal and political equals but also esteeming their convictions and practices as ethically valuable. (p.31)
Forst has little to say about this conception, which he associates principally with value-pluralism, but intimates that he thinks it is too demanding.