terça-feira, 29 de abril de 2014

Chamada: Trust and Democracy (The Monist)

A cientista política Patti Lenard (Ottawa) será a editora da edição "Democracia e Confiança" do periódico The Monist. Serão aceitos trabalhos sobre para o papel da sociedade civil, das associações e medidores de confiança institucional no funcionamento de democracias. Artigos serão aceitos até janeiro de 2015

Patti Lenard é autora do livro Trust, Democracy and Multicultural Challenges 


The Monist: Trust and Democracy (deadline january 2015)

I’m editing an issue of the Monist, on Trust and Democracy, to be published in January 2016.  Submissions due January 2015.  
The role of trust in democracies is typically taken for granted: democracies are successful if and only if they are underpinned by widespread trust relations among their citizens. When citizens trust each other, and when they trust their political leaders, citizens will voluntarily comply with the rules and regulations that govern their lives; in other words, they will cooperate to bring about the benefits typically attributed to living under democratic rule.  One measure of widespread trust is the willingness of citizens to participate in civil society organizations where they learn to cooperate and therefore to trust others. This special issue of The Monistwill focus on the relationship between trust and democracy, for example as outlined by scholars such as Robert Putnam, Pierre Rosanvallon, and Mark Warren. Contributors are asked to focus on questions including but not limited to the following: Is trust essential to democracy? Is trust the right concept with which to explain effective democratic performance, or are other factors (for example, social capital) better suited to do so? How does trust enable democracy to function?
Interested authors should be in touch with me at patti.lenard@uottawa.ca

sábado, 26 de abril de 2014

Forst: Justificação e Crítica

O periódico on-line da Universidade de Notre Dame (Notre Dame Philosophical Review) publicou uma resenha do livro novo de Rainer Forst Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics. A resenha é assinada pelo Uwe Steinhoff  professor de política na Universidade de Hong Kong. No livro Forst reúne seus artigos mais recentes sobre justificação e discute o papel das utopias no pensamento filosófico moderno. 





Rainer Forst

Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics, Ciaran Cronin (tr.), Polity, 2014, 216pp., $24.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780745652290.

Reviewed byUwe Steinhoff, The University of Hong Kong


Rainer Forst's new book is, according to him,
an attempt to develop the program of a theory of justification further -- first when it comes to clarifying basic concepts of political philosophy and, in addition, as regards its implications for critical theory and the possible limits of a mode of thought which accords central importance to discursive justice. (viii)
These concepts prominently include human dignity, human rights, justice, justification, recognition, and tolerance, among others. Yet the book is a rather unsystematic collection of essays, and hence the connections between the different chapters are often tenuous. In particular the last part (“Beyond Justice”), which contains three chapters discussing Henrik Ibsen, Stanley Cavell, and Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, and utopian literature, has little to do with the preceding part of the book. The biggest deficit of Justification and Critique (JaC), however, is that for someone "who has so much to say about justification" (viii), Forst provides little by way of justification for his own core ideas, which have remained basically unchanged -- and undefended -- since his publication of Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Contexts of Justice, CoJ) in 1994.
In the following I will concentrate on Forst's "principle of justification" and his (individual) "right to justification" (in doing so I will also refer to his previous works).
In Contexts of Justice Forst noted that the stages of Habermas's discourse theory of morality "consist in a reconstruction of the argumentative presuppositions of justifying norms, one that leads to the formulation of a discourse principle that serves as a principle of morality or democracy . . . for justifying (in each case different) norms under conditions of mutual and forceless argumentation" (CoJ, 192).[1] Forst himself, however, does not attempt to reconstruct argumentative presuppositions, nor does he attempt to show that they would lead to the discourse principle. Instead, he simply stipulates (more on this below) an equivalent to the discourse principle (without engaging any critics of discourse ethics), namely his own "principle of justification," on which in turn a "right to justification" is supposed to be based (JaC 151, 170-171).
This basic right to justification is based on the recursive general principle that every norm that is to legitimize the use of force (or, more broadly speaking, a morally relevant interference with other's actions) claims to be reciprocally and generally valid and therefore needs to be justifiable by reciprocally and generally non-rejectable reasons. Reciprocity here means that neither party makes any claim to certain rights or resources that are denied to others (reciprocity of content) and that neither party projects its own reasons (values, interests, needs) onto others in arguing for its claims (reciprocity of reasons). One must be willing to argue for basic norms that are to be reciprocally and generally valid and binding with reasons that are not based on contested 'higher' truths or conceptions of the good that can reasonably be questioned and rejected. Generality, then, means that the reasons for such norms need to be shareable among all persons affected, not just the dominant parties. (JaC, 140)
The question, of course, is why one should accept any of these claims; not least since the meaning of some of them is not even clear. For example, what is the meaning of the parentheses? Are only norms that legitimize the use of force morally relevant? If so, why? Or are norms that legitimize non-violent interference with other people's actions also morally relevant? And why is only interference relevant? Why not non-interference (like refraining from helping somebody in need)? Moreover, by which criteria is it to be decided what is "morally relevant" in the first place? Is a criterion that stands in need of justification simply being presupposed here? Furthermore, and most importantly, why should a norm's validity depend on its justifiability to everyone (at least to every person affected)? In the end, does this whole idea that moral principles have to be justified to everybody not rest on a confusion of two senses of justification: justification in the sense of the speech act of giving to someone a justification for something, and justification in the sense of a proposition's or principle's property of being justified for someone, that is, of being legitimately applicable to her, him, or it? Is it not quite possible that something is justified for a child molester or genocidal dictator, that is, legitimately applicable to him or her, without anybody having to (be able to) justify it to him or her?[2] Forst, despite his emphasis on justification, answers none of these questions, in fact, he does not ask them, nor does he provide a conceptual analysis of the concept of justification.

quarta-feira, 23 de abril de 2014

Repensando a Esfera Pública

Rúrion Melo (USP) apresentará seu texto "Repensando a Esfera Pública" nessa quinta-feira (24/04) como parte dos seminários semestrais de ciência política da USP. O evento é aberto a todos os interessados. O working paper pode ser encontrado no link abaixo:


- Rurion: "Repensando a Esfera Pública" 





segunda-feira, 21 de abril de 2014

Fraser: A "transnacionalização" da esfera pública

Transnationalizing the Public Sphere o mais recente livro de Nancy Fraser (New School) retoma seu debate de longa data com a teoria da ação comunicativa de Habermas para repensar a categoria de esfera pública em um mundo globalizado. As propostas de Fraser são debatidas por Kate Nash, David Owen, dentre outros. 

O texto original de Fraser de 2007 pode ser encontrado no link abaixo:






Nancy Fraser et al. 

Is Habermas’s concept of the public sphere still relevant in an age of globalization, when the transnational flows of people and information have become increasingly intensive and when the nation-state can no longer be taken granted as the natural frame for social and political debate? This is the question posed with characteristic acuity by Nancy Fraser in her influential article ‘Transnationalizing the Public Sphere?’ Challenging careless uses of the term ‘global public sphere’, Fraser raises the debate about the nature and role of the public sphere in a global age to a new level. While drawing on the richness of Habermas’s conception and remaining faithful to the spirit of critical theory, Fraser thoroughly reconstructs the concepts of inclusion, legitimacy and efficacy for our globalizing times. 

This book includes Fraser’s original article as well as specially commissioned contributions that raise searching questions about the theoretical assumptions and empirical grounds of Fraser’s argument. They are concerned with the fundamental premises of Habermas’s development of the concept of the public sphere as a normative ideal in complex societies; the significance of the fact that the public sphere emerged in modern states that were also imperial; whether ‘scaling up’ to a global public sphere means giving up on local and national publics; the role of ‘counterpublics’ in developing alternative globalization; and what inclusion might possibly mean for a global public. Fraser responds to these questions in detail in an extended reply to her critics.

An invaluable resource for students and scholars concerned with the role of the public sphere beyond the nation-state, this book will also be welcomed by anyone interested in globalization and democracy today.


sábado, 19 de abril de 2014

Krugman: A nova Belle Époque

Paul Krugman resenhou a tradução de Capital in the Twenty-First Century do economista francês Thomas Pickett para a NY Review. Além de escrever uma resenha na qual as teses de Pickett são apresentadas de modo claro e respeitoso, Krugman acrescenta um outro ponto importante, mas insuficientemente explorado no livro referente ao caso norte-americano. Ainda que o crescimento da desigualdade nos EUA respeite o padrão-Pickett (razão entre a taxa de retorno do capital em relação ao crescimento econômico) Krugman chama atenção para o papel dos "supersalários" (e não apenas os ganhos com capital) entre os 1% mais ricos e seu impacto na reprodução da desigualdade - o que, na verdade, não muda muito o quadro sombrio de Pickett caso os herdeiros desses "super-executivos" tenham acesso a essa fortuna.

[...]

Capital still matters; at the very highest reaches of society, income from capital still exceeds income from wages, salaries, and bonuses. Piketty estimates that the increased inequality of capital income accounts for about a third of the overall rise in US inequality. But wage income at the top has also surged. Real wages for most US workers have increased little if at all since the early 1970s, but wages for the top one percent of earners have risen 165 percent, and wages for the top 0.1 percent have risen 362 percent. If Rastignac were alive today, Vautrin might concede that he could in fact do as well by becoming a hedge fund manager as he could by marrying wealth.
What explains this dramatic rise in earnings inequality, with the lion’s share of the gains going to people at the very top? Some US economists suggest that it’s driven by changes in technology. In a famous 1981 paper titled “The Economics of Superstars,” the Chicago economist Sherwin Rosen argued that modern communications technology, by extending the reach of talented individuals, was creating winner-take-all markets in which a handful of exceptional individuals reap huge rewards, even if they’re only modestly better at what they do than far less well paid rivals.
Piketty is unconvinced. As he notes, conservative economists love to talk about the high pay of performers of one kind or another, such as movie and sports stars, as a way of suggesting that high incomes really are deserved. But such people actually make up only a tiny fraction of the earnings elite. What one finds instead is mainly executives of one sort or another—people whose performance is, in fact, quite hard to assess or give a monetary value to.

Para saber mais sobre livro, ver nosso post: "Capitalismo ou Democracia?"


Why We're in A New Gilded Age
Paul Krugman


Capital in the Twenty-First Century

by Thomas Piketty, translated from the French by Arthur Goldhammer
Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 685 pp., $39.95


Thomas Piketty, professor at the Paris School of Economics, isn’t a household name, although that may change with the English-language publication of his magnificent, sweeping meditation on inequality, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Yet his influence runs deep. It has become a commonplace to say that we are living in a second Gilded Age—or, as Piketty likes to put it, a second Belle Époque—defined by the incredible rise of the “one percent.” But it has only become a commonplace thanks to Piketty’s work. In particular, he and a few colleagues (notably Anthony Atkinson at Oxford and Emmanuel Saez at Berkeley) have pioneered statistical techniques that make it possible to track the concentration of income and wealth deep into the past—back to the early twentieth century for America and Britain, and all the way to the late eighteenth century for France.

Thomas Piketty, professor at the Paris School of Economics, isn’t a household name, although that may change with the English-language publication of his magnificent, sweeping meditation on inequality, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Yet his influence runs deep. It has become a commonplace to say that we are living in a second Gilded Age—or, as Piketty likes to put it, a second Belle Époque—defined by the incredible rise of the “one percent.” But it has only become a commonplace thanks to Piketty’s work. In particular, he and a few colleagues (notably Anthony Atkinson at Oxford and Emmanuel Saez at Berkeley) have pioneered statistical techniques that make it possible to track the concentration of income and wealth deep into the past—back to the early twentieth century for America and Britain, and all the way to the late eighteenth century for France.
The result has been a revolution in our understanding of long-term trends in inequality. Before this revolution, most discussions of economic disparity more or less ignored the very rich. Some economists (not to mention politicians) tried to shout down any mention of inequality at all: “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution,” declared Robert Lucas Jr. of the University of Chicago, the most influential macroeconomist of his generation, in 2004. But even those willing to discuss inequality generally focused on the gap between the poor or the working class and the merely well-off, not the truly rich—on college graduates whose wage gains outpaced those of less-educated workers, or on the comparative good fortune of the top fifth of the population compared with the bottom four fifths, not on the rapidly rising incomes of executives and bankers.
It therefore came as a revelation when Piketty and his colleagues showed that incomes of the now famous “one percent,” and of even narrower groups, are actually the big story in rising inequality. And this discovery came with a second revelation: talk of a second Gilded Age, which might have seemed like hyperbole, was nothing of the kind. In America in particular the share of national income going to the top one percent has followed a great U-shaped arc. Before World War I the one percent received around a fifth of total income in both Britain and the United States. By 1950 that share had been cut by more than half. But since 1980 the one percent has seen its income share surge again—and in the United States it’s back to what it was a century ago.
The result has been a revolution in our understanding of long-term trends in inequality. Before this revolution, most discussions of economic disparity more or less ignored the very rich. Some economists (not to mention politicians) tried to shout down any mention of inequality at all: “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution,” declared Robert Lucas Jr. of the University of Chicago, the most influential macroeconomist of his generation, in 2004. But even those willing to discuss inequality generally focused on the gap between the poor or the working class and the merely well-off, not the truly rich—on college graduates whose wage gains outpaced those of less-educated workers, or on the comparative good fortune of the top fifth of the population compared with the bottom four fifths, not on the rapidly rising incomes of executives and bankers.
It therefore came as a revelation when Piketty and his colleagues showed that incomes of the now famous “one percent,” and of even narrower groups, are actually the big story in rising inequality. And this discovery came with a second revelation: talk of a second Gilded Age, which might have seemed like hyperbole, was nothing of the kind. In America in particular the share of national income going to the top one percent has followed a great U-shaped arc. Before World War I the one percent received around a fifth of total income in both Britain and the United States. By 1950 that share had been cut by more than half. But since 1980 the one percent has seen its income share surge again—and in the United States it’s back to what it was a century ago.
Still, today’s economic elite is very different from that of the nineteenth century, isn’t it? Back then, great wealth tended to be inherited; aren’t today’s economic elite people who earned their position? Well, Piketty tells us that this isn’t as true as you think, and that in any case this state of affairs may prove no more durable than the middle-class society that flourished for a generation after World War II. The big idea of Capital in the Twenty-First Century is that we haven’t just gone back to nineteenth-century levels of income inequality, we’re also on a path back to “patrimonial capitalism,” in which the commanding heights of the economy are controlled not by talented individuals but by family dynasties.

terça-feira, 15 de abril de 2014

Entrevista: John Mccormick

Robert Jubb (Leicester) e Stuart White (Oxford) entrevistaram o professor de ciência política John Mccormick (Chicago) a respeito do seu livro - já célebre - Machiavellian Democracy. Mccormick defende um modelo populista de democracia contra a concentração de poder econômico e político nas democracias representativas contemporâneas, fundamentando seus argumentos no modelo de contestação política republicana apresentada por Maquiavel. 

Para quem se interessar pela teoria democrática de Mccormick, a Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política traduziu o artigo "Democracia Maquiaveliana: controlando as elites com um populismo feroz" no qual o autor sintetiza os principais argumentos do seu livro. 


Can democrats learn from Machiavelli?



When politicians are described today as ‘Machiavellian’ the implication is that they are no more than cynical graspers at power for its own sake. Most historians of political thought have long argued that Machiavelli’s own views and politics were more complex than this. In his 2011 book, Machiavellian Democracy (previously reviewed for OurKingdom by Guy Aitchison), the political theorist John P. McCormick offers an innovative reading of Machiavelli. According to McCormick, Machiavelli was not only a republican thinker, but by the standards of his day, and our own, a radically democratic one. Moreover, some of Machiavelli’s ideas, such as his advocacy of plebeian, tribunate institutions, arguably remain relevant to today’s discussions of democratic renewal. Robert Jubb and Stuart White interview John here for the ‘Democratic Wealth’ series.
OurKingdom: Machiavelli's key works are The Prince and the Discourses. One is a manual on how to get and use princely power, the other a discussion of republics. Do we need to reconcile these two works? If so, how?
John P. McCormick: I think that the two works actually reconcile themselves.  Machiavelli declares in the Discourses that republics must be founded or fundamentally reformed by a single individual.  Romulus is his quintessential example of republic’s founder, and Cleomenes is one of his chief examples of a republic’s reformer.  Thus, Machiavelli’s advice to princes within The Prince(and, indeed, within the Discourses itself), in so far as it aids individual founders and reformers, is perfectly compatible with his republicanism.  Moreover, Machiavelli offers the same, often brutally immoral advice to political actors—princes and magistrates, peoples and elites—in both books.
OurKingdom: You argue in Machiavellian Democracy that previous scholarship has not attended enough to differences in republican thinking in Florence at the time of Machiavelli, leading to a misrepresentation of Machiavelli. Can you explain? Why might this have happened?
John P. McCormick: I think that many scholars have overcompensated in their efforts to underplay or contextualize Machiavelli’s immorality or amorality by disproportionately emphasizing the continuity of his political thought with that of traditional Roman republicans like Cicero and Florentine civic humanists likeLeonardo Bruni.  In so doing, they tend to overlook the unprecedented extent to which Machiavelli departs from the political thinking of republicans from the past or from his own intellectual milieu: in particular, they often miss the full extent to which Machiavelli was an advocate of popular participation within republics; indeed, a champion of popular ascendance over the elites of republics.  There are, of course, exceptions to this charge:  Felix Gilbert andJohn Pocock quite convincingly demonstrate how Machiavelli’s more democratic republicanism differs from the aristocratic republicanism of his younger contemporary Francesco Guicciardini - although, I’d say that they did not go far enough in this regard.
OurKingdom: Let’s explore the theme of popular participation further. You emphasise the way that Machiavelli thought that the wealthy of his time, primarily the nobility, were the greatest threat to a free society. What kinds of institutions did Machiavelli think would help to empower the people relative to the nobles? How did Machiavelli use Roman history to illustrate both the importance of empowering the people against the nobles and the means necessary to do so?
John P. McCormick: First and foremost, Machiavelli recommended that republics revive the institution of the plebeian tribunate from ancient Rome, an institution that he claimed made Rome “more perfect” by enabling common Roman citizens to “beat back the insolence of the nobles.”  Rome’s wealthiest and most prominent citizens were ineligible to hold the office of plebeian tribune, an office with extensive power within the Roman constitution: tribunes wielded veto authority over most policy measures; initiated and led discussions over legislation in Rome’s popular assemblies; and they publicly tried wealthy and prominent citizens before the people for political crimes.  When the Medici asked Machiavelli to draft a constitutional model for the reformation of the Florentine Republic, Machiavelli included a tribunesque office in the constitution, which he called “provosts.”