Aula inaugural: A Lei da Guerra

O professor Rolf Kuntz ministrará a aula inaugural de 2014 do curso de filosofia da USP. O título da aula será "A Lei da Guerra - um tema clássico". O evento ocorrerá dia 18 de fevereiro às 19h.

O cartaz do evento pode ser visto abaixo:

A lei da guerra - um tema clássico

Prof. Rolf Kuntz

Dia 18 de Fevereiro de 2014

às 19h00 - Sala 14

Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 315 - Cidade Universitária - São Paulo

Sen: Tolerando o Intolerável

O economista Amartya Sen (Harvard) ministrou a conferência Poverty and the Tolerance of the Intolerable este mês na London School of Economics. Sen discorreu sobre os efeitos da pobreza extrema em seu país de origem (Índia, mas valeria para o Brasil) e, principalmente, sobre as estratégias de tipo "culpar a vítima"  típicas em contextos de desigualdade social.

Ouça abaixo o podcast da palestra.

(Amartya Sen na LSE janeiro 2014)

- Sen: "Poverty and the Tolerance of the Intolerable" (podcast)

Repensando o aborto na Igreja Católica

O filósofo Gary Gutting no blog The Stone argumenta que a partir da última "exortação aos fieis" escrita pelo papa Francisco (denominada Evangelli Gaudium), e de acordo com a longa tradição racionalista no interior da Igreja Católica, os católicos encontram um fundamento moral contra a proibição "absoluta" do aborto. Afinal, afirma Gutting, se é de fato errado tirar a vida de uma criança tendo como princípio o "valor inviolável de cada vida humana", é possível ao mesmo tempo justificar não apenas a interrupção da gravidez nos primeiros meses em casos de violência sexual (outra violação do princípio) como também interromper gestações nas quais esteja comprovado que existe uma diferença moral importante entre um feto apenas potencialmente humano, e a vida de uma criança.

[...]

There is, then, a strong case for thinking that abortions always bring about some bad results — at a minimum the loss of potential human life — and that for most pregnancies abortion would be morally wrong. But this conclusion is limited in two ways: A woman’s right to control her reproductive life can, as in the case of rape, offset even a person’s right to life; and at least at the earlier stages of pregnancy, the embryo has only the moral standing of potential, not actual, human life, which may be overridden by harm to humans with full moral standing.

These limitations, I suggest, correspond to the “very difficult situations” (such as “rape” and “extreme poverty”) in which the pope, in “Evangelii Gaudium,” admitted the church has “done little to adequately accompany women.” Allowing for exceptions to the moral condemnation of abortion in some of these painful situations would not contradict the pope’s overall commitment to the “value of the human person.” Rather, it would admit what reason shows: There are morally difficult issues about abortion that should be decided by conscience, not legislation. The result would be a church acting according to the pope’s own stated standard: preaching not “certain doctrinal or moral points based on specific ideological options” but rather the gospel of love.

- Gutting: "Should Pope Francis Rethink Abortion?

Davos e a disparidade de renda

Segundo o relatório Riscos Globais 2014, a ser apresentado e debatido na edição deste ano do Fórum Econômico Mundial em Davos, a "grave disparidade de renda" caracteriza não apenas o risco societal mais grave para as economias mundiais (na frente de candidatos mais óbvios como "instabilidade política") como representa, dentre os riscos de todas as outras categorias consideradas pelo relatório,  como a maior probabilidade de ocorrência no curto prazo - justamente por já estar acontecendo. O relatório também alerta para as relações sistêmicas entre disparidade, desemprego, crise fiscal e instabilidade política, além de identificar no desemprego dos jovens o principal impacto negativo da desigualdade econômica. 

O fato da disparidade de renda figurar nessa posição de destaque pelo terceiro ano consecutivo deveria alertar as elites econômicas em Davos para os efeitos corrosivos da desigualdade econômica. 

[...]

Macroeconomic risks were strongly linked by respondents to various socio-economic issues. Failure of a financial mechanism or institution, fiscal crises and liquidity crises are risks closely interrelated among themselves and also with the risks of high levels of unemployment and underemployment, income disparity and political and social instability. Recent examples illustrate the reality of these interconnections – the failure of financial institutions brought about a financial crisis that resulted in liquidity crises affecting multiple national economies. This in turn led to higher levels of unemployment, widened income disparity and associated political and social tensions and protests, notably in some European countries and large emerging markets.

- Global Risks 2014 (9th Edition)

  

Livro: Being Realistic About Reasons

O professor de Harvard T. M. Scanlon lançou seu mais recente livro pela Oxford Press: Being Realistic About Reasons. Nessa obra, Scanlon enfrenta as principais objeções contra o cognitivismo moral, um dos argumentos mais importantes de sua filosofia contratualista. Segundo essa posição, proposições normativas a respeito de nossas ações (é certo fazer x, é errado fazer y, etc.) podem ser consideradas verdadeiras ou falsas objetivamente.  Em outras palavras, temos razões normativas para agir para além de nossos desejos e inclinações subjetivas. Os capítulos do livro foram baseados nas Locke Lectures ministrada por Scanlon em 2009 (o audio das palestras pode ser acessado aqui). É possível falarmos desde de já que a obra será um novo clássico da filosofia moral.

Para quem tiver interesse em entender melhor quais as diferenças entre cognitivismo e anti-cognitivismo morais, existe uma boa entrada na SEP sobre o debate:

- Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-congnitivism [SEP]

- Scanlon John Locke Lectures 

Being Realistic About Reasons
by T. M. Scanlon

Description:

T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. 

Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

África e o Tribunal Penal Internacional

Kenneth Roth escreveu uma matéria para o The New York Review of Books na qual analisa as recentes críticas feitas por alguns líderes africanos contra o Tribunal Penal Internacional (ICC em inglês). A despeito de contar com uma maioria de Estados africanos como membros colaboradores, apenas africanos foram condenados por genocídio ou crimes contra a humanidade em 11 anos de funcionamento da corte (a lista dos condenados por ser consultada aqui). Mais do que um passo significativo na punição de violações de direitos humanos, alegam os críticos do Tribunal, o dado revela a posição de barganha desfavorecida do continente frente a uma comunidade global que, quando necessário, consegue absolver seus criminosos por meio de manobras políticas. Legítima ou não, a crítica nos leva aos limites dos mecanismos atuais de justiça global. 

[...]

That war criminals still run free where the court cannot act is hardly reason to refrain from prosecution where it can. Yet on a continent whose people have suffered under colonialism, the charge that they are subject to an international standard of justice that no one else actively faces—not in Afghanistan or Iraq, not in Sri Lanka or Israel—resonates among African leaders and some of their constituents. And while most European governments have accepted the court’s jurisdiction, it doesn’t help that some of the world’s most powerful nations—the United States, China, Russia, and India, to name a few—have not.

Africa Attacks The International Criminal Court

Kenneth Roth/NY Review

What are we to make of the fact that in its eleven-year history, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has prosecuted only Africans? Should the court be condemned for discrimination—for taking advantage of Africa’s weak global position—as some African leaders contend? Or should it be applauded for giving long-overdue attention to atrocities in Africa—a sign that finally someone is concerned about the countless ignored African victims, as many African activists contend? This debate is at the heart of one of the most serious challenges the ICC has ever faced. If the current attack on it succeeds, the court’s future may be in doubt.

The ICC was founded in 2002, under a treaty negotiated at a global conference in Rome, as an independent judicial body that would challenge impunity for the gravest international crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Unlike the International Court of Justice, which is also based in The Hague but settles legal disputes between states, the International Criminal Court addresses mass atrocities committed by individuals. To avoid prosecution, ruthless national leaders too often threaten, corrupt, or compromise judges and prosecutors at home, but those in The Hague should be beyond the reach of such obstructionism. The ICC is meant as a court of last resort for victims and survivors who cannot find justice in their own country and as a deterrent to leaders who have little to fear from domestic prosecution. The court has now been accepted by 122 states. The United States has not joined it out of fear that Americans might be prosecuted.

The issue of the ICC’s focus on Africa has gained prominence as it proceeds against its most powerful suspect so far, President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. He is accused of directing some of the violence that shook his country in late 2007 and early 2008 following vigorously contested elections. An estimated 1,100 people were killed and as many as 650,000 were forced to flee their homes.

Kenyatta has appeared in The Hague voluntarily and has mounted a vigorous defense. But he has also used his position as head of state to turn every available weapon against the court in an effort to avoid prosecution. The Kenyan government has solicited demands from the African Union that he not be required to appear at trial. It has asked the United Nations Security Council to delay the case. It has pleaded with the governments that are members of the ICC to change the rules, and it has sent diplomats around Africa with the apparent aim of orchestrating a mass withdrawal from the court. None of these efforts so far has stopped the case from proceeding.

The ICC is hardly an institution that looks anti-African. Its largest block of members—34 of its 122 states—is from Africa, and they were central in negotiating the Rome treaty that established the court. Those thirty-four states—including Kenya—represent a solid majority of Africa’s fifty-four nations. The ICC’s chief prosecutor is an African—Fatou Bensouda of Gambia. She assumed the post in 2012 after having served for eight years as the deputy prosecutor. Africans serve among the court’s judges and the prosecutor’s staff.

50 anos do Golpe de 1964

A FFLCH (USP) montou uma programação no primeiro semestre de 2014 para relembrar os eventos que levaram ao golpe de Estado no Brasil 50 anos atrás. O evento é multidisciplinar e entre as mesas redondas serão discutidos temas como o populismo, a onda autoritária na América Latina e o impacto da ditadura nas letras brasileiras. 

Abaixo, o programa completo do evento.

FFLCH discute os 50 anos do golpe de 1964

V Meetings in Ethics and Political Philosophy (Minho)

O Grupo de Teoria Política da universidade do Minho (Braga) está recebendo artigos para a quinta edição dos Meetings in Ethics and Political Philosophy. O evento ocorrerá entre os dias 15 e 16 de maio e contará com as presenças de Jeff McMahan (Rutgers) e Adam Swift (Warwick) como palestrantes convidados. O encontro é uma das reuniões mais importantes de teoria política da Europa - reunindo pesquisadores de Portugal, Inglaterra, França e Espanha - além de ficar em uma das mais belas regiões vinícolas do mundo!

O prazo para o envio de trabalhos é 31 de janeiro. 

V Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy

After four successful meetings on previous years, we now welcome paper proposals for the fifth Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy, which will be held at University of Minho, Braga (Portugal), on May 15-16 2014.

We invite contributions in both moral philosophy and normative political theory. The Meetings provide an excellent opportunity to present both advanced and exploratory work in front of an open and welcoming audience. The call is open to graduate students, junior researchers and senior scholars.

This year, we will have two keynote speakers:

Prof. Jeff McMahan (Rutgers) will offer a lecture on "Proportionality in Self-Defense and War."

And

Prof. Adam Swift (Warwick) will offer a lecture entitled "Justice, Legitimacy, Democracy."

If you are interested in presenting a paper on a topic of your choice, please send your contact and affiliation, an abstract (300 to 500 words) and 5 key words, by January 31st to Michele Loi (meetings.epp@gmail.com) and David Alvarez (alvarez (at) ilch.uminho.pt) . Abstracts will be submitted to peer review.

Deadline for submissions: 31st January 2014.

Deadline for notification of acceptance: 21st February 2014.

Information about registration fees, accommodation and travelling is available online .

This event is organized by the Political Theory Group of CEHUM, University of Minho (Braga).

For the Portuguese version of this call for paper click here.

A teoria política e sua metodologia

Os professores da LSE Christian List e Laura Valentini postaram o artigo "Political Theory" na base de dados SSRN. O trabalho continua os esforços já desenvolvido em outras partes pelos autores de explicitar a natureza e a metodologia apropriada da teoria política normativa, especialmente a dimensão "idealizada" da iniciativa. 

- List & Valentini: Political Theory 

Abstract:

Political theory, sometimes also called “normative political theory”, is a subfield of the disciplines of philosophy and political science that addresses conceptual, normative, and evaluative questions concerning politics and society, broadly construed. Examples are: When is a society just? What does it mean for its members to be free? When is one distribution of goods socially preferable to another? What makes a political authority legitimate? How should we trade off different values, such as liberty, prosperity, and security, against one another? What do we owe, not just to our fellow citizens, but to people in the world at large? In this article, we review the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory: the one commonly described as “analytic” political theory. In Section 1, we briefly demarcate the scope of political theory. In Section 2, we comment on the analysis of political concepts. In Section 3, we introduce the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts. In Section 4, we discuss the methods of assessing such principles and theories, for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. In Section 5, we review a recent debate on how abstract and idealized political theory should be. In Section 6, finally, we discuss the significance of disagreement in political theory. Although we cover established ground, we do so from an angle that will be somewhat unfamiliar to at least some political theorists – namely an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. We have chosen this angle with a view to systematizing the activity of analytic political theorizing so as to make its connections with other fields of philosophy and positive science more transparent.

Chamada: Liberdade de Expressão e Deliberação Púbica (Tromso)

A Universidade Ártica da Noruega (Tromso) está recebendo artigos para o congresso internacional Free Speech, Public Deliberation and Global Affairs até o dia 15 de março. A universidade possui um dos melhores centros de pesquisa em ética global do mundo (conferir o site do grupo: Pluralism, Democracy and Justice Research Group) e o evento contará com a presença de Andreas Follesdal e David Held, dentre outros. 

Free Speech, Public Deliberation, and Global Affairs

17–19 June 2014

University of Tromsø – The Arctic University of Norway

Keynote speakers:

Andreas Føllesdal (University of Oslo)

Carol C. Gould (City University of New York)

David Held (Durham University)

Andrew March (Yale University)

Christian F. Rostbøll (University of Copenhagen)

CALL FOR PAPERS

Submission deadline: 15 March 2014

The aim of the conference is to provide a robust forum for exploring contemporary problems of democratic deliberation and freedom of speech on a local and global level. Special emphasis will be placed on the interplay between democratic legitimacy and freedom of speech.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

• freedom of speech and democracy
• freedom of speech, plurality, and civility norms
• freedom of speech and human rights
• justifications for protecting and suppressing freedom of speech
• harmful speech and religion
• deliberative democracy, preferences, and interests
• deliberative capacity and participation
• deliberation and comprehensive secular and religious worldviews
• deliberative democracy and ideology
• pluralism, religion, and accepted public reasons
• challenges from agonist and convergence conceptions of democratic engagement
• global governance, accountability, and deliberation
• global democracy and international relations
• global democratic polity and nation states

Please submit abstracts as email attachments to:pdjconferences@hsl.uit.no. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf files, and not exceed 500 words. Please put ‘Conference Abstract Submission’ as the subject of your email and include your name, departmental affiliation, email address, and the title of your paper in the body of the email. Abstracts should be prepared for blind review; please ensure that your abstract is free from identifying personal details. Please note that participants who need visa and a formal letter of invitation, should submit their abstract by 15 February 2014, in order to receive the notification of result by 1 March 2014.

 SUBMISSION DEADLINE: 15 MARCH 2014

NOTIFICATION OF RESULTS: 30 APRIL 2014

Participants presenting papers at the conference can apply to have some of the expenses for accommodation covered. Participants at the conference will get hotel rooms at special rates at Quality Hotel Saga located in the center of Tromsø. There is no conference fee, and the conference dinner is free of charge to conference participants. We can cover travel expenses only for a limited number of participants. For further information and updates about the conference, please visit our website: http://uit.no/free-speech-and-public-deliberation.

For questions, please contact: Erik Christensen, e-mail: erik.christensen@uit.no, or Tomasz Jarymowicz, e-mail: tomasz.jarymowicz@uit.no. Please note that abstracts should be submitted to: pdjconferences@hsl.uit.no.

The conference is organized by the Pluralism, Democracy, and Justice Research Group, and the Department of Philosophy at UiT The Arctic University of Norway, supported by the Research Council of Norway.

  Organizing Committee

Ph.D. Candidate Tomasz Jarymowicz

Dr. Øyvind Stokke

Dr. Erik Christensen

The Ethics of Revolution

O filósofo Allen Buchanan (Duke) publicou no último número da Philosophy and Public Affair um artigo sobre os limites da intervenção humanitária em contextos revolucionários. Buchanan procura integrar a já vasta bibliografia sobre ética da intervenção e da guerra justa com as demandas morais de uma revolução contra governos ilegítimos.

Buchanan: "The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for The Ethics of Intervention"

SP Cidade Tensa

Prefeito da maior cidade do país, o ex-professor de ciência política da USP Fernando Haddad (PT) foi entrevista pelo El País sobre o primeiro ano de sua gestão. Na entrevista, Haddad avalia as principais conquistas bem como os reveses mais graves até o momento - como a revogação do aumento das passagens e a disputa pelo aumento do IPTU das regiões mais valorizadas da cidade.  Como afirma o prefeito, São Paulo "é uma cidade tensa". 

"A minha metrica de sucesso não é a reeleição"
El País

São dez e meia da manhã do último dia de 2013 quando o prefeito petista Fernando Haddad, 50, recebe a reportagem do El PAÍS na sede da Prefeitura de São Paulo, no centro da cidade. O semblante de esgotamento e o par de tênis nos pés permitiriam confundi-lo, facilmente, com um maratonista da São Silvestre, corrida que naquele momento passava pela porta da administração municipal. Mas o aparente cansaço do administrador da maior cidade da América Latina tem outras causas. É o resultado de um ano intenso, permeado por derrotas políticas que devem trazer um impacto significativo nas finanças e nos investimentos de 2014.

Em junho, uma série de protestos contra o aumento de 20 centavos na tarifa de transporte público ganhou força depois de uma violenta repressão policial. Sob pressão popular, Haddad e o governador Geraldo Alckmin (que gerencia o sistema de trens e metrô) anunciaram a volta da tarifa para os 3 reais.

Mas os protestos continuaram e impactaram a imagem de Haddad: o número de pessoas que consideram seu governo bom ou ótimo caiu de 34%, no início de junho, para 18%, em novembro, segundo pesquisa Datafolha. E quando a situação parecia melhorar, veio um novo golpe: ao tentar reajustar o IPTU, imposto que incide sobre os imóveis, Haddad foi barrado pela Justiça após uma ação comandada pela Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp), que tem como presidente Paulo Skaf, provável candidato pelo PMDB nas eleições para o Governo de São Paulo neste ano.

O resultado dos dois golpes foi um congelamento de ao menos 800 milhões de reais que seriam usados pela prefeitura para seus investimentos de 2014. Um impacto definido por um Haddad especialista na doutrina de Karl Marx como a vitória da Casa Grande perante a Senzala, uma referência ao livro do sociólogo Gilberto Freyre, que analisa a formação do Brasil. “Para aqueles que acreditam que o nosso problema de bem estar social é falta de investimento público, [a derrota do IPTU] trará consequências."

Pergunta: Como é ser prefeito da maior cidade da América Latina?

Resposta: Uma experiência desafiadora. Mas há também a sensação de que você consegue dar resposta aos problemas, desde que você tenha alguma determinação para mudar a realidade da cidade. Em geral, os prefeitos que deixam uma marca na sua cidade foram os que tomaram as providências que todo mundo sabia que precisavam ser tomadas, mas eram postergadas em função de circunstâncias conjunturais. A questão da mobilidade é clássica no mundo inteiro. Todo mundo sabe que deve priorizar o transporte público, mas tomar a decisão de priorizá-lo é difícil porque incomoda aqueles que estão comodamente utilizando o transporte individual. Já tínhamos anunciado na campanha que faríamos, mas impulsionados pelas manifestações de junho, fizemos em seis meses o que faríamos em quatro anos [com o aumento das faixas exclusivas de ônibus], o que resultou em um incremento na velocidade do ônibus, superior a verificada em Nova York e Paris, que tomaram a mesma decisão.

P: Mas as pesquisas mostram que pessoas não deixaram o carro em casa, que o número dos que usam ônibus não aumentou muito.

R: Mas deixou de cair. Vinha caindo consideravelmente. Essa mudança não se faz em meses.

P: Há uma forma de estimular as pessoas a deixarem o carro?

R: É a perseverança. O trânsito em São Paulo piorou menos em 2013 do que em 2012, quando não se investiu um centavo em transporte público. O trânsito aumentou 11% de 2011 para 2012, sem uma faixa, sem um corredor. E de 2012 para 2013, 7%. Óbvio que é uma mudança de cultura, talvez geracional. No meu tempo, o presente de quem entrava na faculdade era um carro. Outro dia, meu filho me disse que pensava em se desfazer do carro, em função dos custos associados. Paga-se muito mais de seguro de carro em São Paulo do que de IPTU.

P: Esse é um valor percebido por um grupo mais crítico. A população, em geral, ainda não vê assim.

R: Mas os 70% que usam transporte público entendem.

P: E isso não deveria se refletir em apoio ao seu nome?

R: Vamos dissociar essas duas coisas. O apoio à medida [implementação das faixas] foi medido por dois institutos de pesquisa, e está na casa dos 90%. Uma coisa é aprovar a medida, outra coisa é aprovar o político. Estamos num ano muito atípico do ponto de vista de aprovação aos governantes, de maneira geral. A aprovação da nossa reforma educacional é na casa dos 90%. De mobilidade, 90%. Se perguntarem sobre as medidas para combate à corrupção, certamente vai ser de 100%. E isso tudo pode não se refletir em apoio político.

P: Isso é uma sina em São Paulo, onde poucos prefeitos reelegeram sucessores?

A França e a questão da imigração

Professor de filosofia da Paris 7, Justin Smith publicou um post no The Stone a respeito da questão imigratória na França. Norte-americano de nascença, Smith contrasta sua posição na sociedade francesa ("expatriado") com a das minorias étnicas que, supostamente, ameaçariam a identidade do país ("imigrantes"). Existiria algo além de preconceito nacionalista capaz de sustentar essa distinção?

[...]

Is there any justification for the two-tiered distinction between expatriates and immigrants, or for the extra impediments members of the latter group face when they try to settle in a new country? Nativist Europeans such as Finkielkraut will often express a concern about being “overrun” by members of ethnic groups from economically disadvantaged states or regions. Most of us can agree that even if there is not an absolute right to preserve one’s culture’s purity, it is at least a genuine good to be able to spend one’s life surrounded by others who share many of the same values and traditions. Something would be lost if, say, massive immigration led to a sudden shift in the demographics of Iceland, so that native Icelanders were now a minority in that once homogeneous island nation — and this would be a loss both for the country itself, as well as for those of us on the outside who value something akin to the cultural equivalent of biodiversity.

Does Immigration Mean ‘France Is Over’?

By JUSTIN E. H. SMITH

PARIS — It is difficult to go more than a day in France without hearing someone express the conviction that the greatest problem in the country is its ethnic minorities, that the presence of immigrants compromises the identity of France itself. This conviction is typically expressed without any acknowledgment of the country’s historical responsibility as a colonial power for the presence of former colonial subjects in metropolitan France, nor with any willingness to recognize that France will be ethnically diverse from here on out, and that it’s the responsibility of the French as much as of the immigrants to make this work.

In the past year I have witnessed incessant stop-and-frisk of young black men in the Gare du Nord; in contrast with New York, here in Paris this practice is scarcely debated. I was told by a taxi driver as we passed through a black neighborhood: “I hope you got your shots. You don’t need to go to Africa anymore to get a tropical disease.” On numerous occasions, French strangers have offered up the observation to me, in reference to ethnic minorities going about their lives in the capital: “This is no longer France. France is over.” There is a constant, droning presupposition in virtually all social interactions that a clear and meaningful division can be made between the people who make up the real France and the impostors.

I arrived here in 2012 — an American recently teaching in a Canadian university — to take a position at a French university in Paris. I had long been a moderately interested observer of French history, culture, and politics, but had never lived here for any length of time, and had on previous stays never grown attuned to the deep rifts that mark so much of daily life here. 

When I am addressed by strangers anxious about the fate of their country, I try to reply patiently. They hear my American accent, but this in itself does not dissuade them, for I belong to a different category of foreigner. I am not read as an “immigrant,” but rather as an “expatriate,” here for voluntary and probably frivolous reasons, rather than out of economic necessity or fear for my own survival or freedom. This division is not just a street-level prejudice: it is also written into the procedure at French immigration offices, where all foreigners must go to obtain their residence permits, but where the Malians and Congolese are taken into one room, and Americans and Swedes into another. For the former, the procedure has an air of quarantine, and the attitude of the officials is something resembling that of prison guards; for the latter, the visit to the immigration office feels rather more like a welcome ceremony, and everything about our interaction with the officials bespeaks a presumption of equality.

Equality is of course one of the virtues on which the French Republic was founded, yet critics of the Enlightenment philosophy behind the Revolution have long noticed a double standard: when equality is invoked, these critics note, it is understood that this is equality among equals. Political and social inequality is allowed to go on as before, as long as it is presumed that this is rooted in a natural inequality. In the late 18th century, such a presumption informed the reactions of many in the French to the revolution led by François-Dominique Toussaint Louverture in Haiti, who was himself inspired by the events of 1789 and who took the idea of equality to be one with universal scope.

For most of the history of the French Republic, the boundary between the equal and the unequal was determined by the dynamics of empire: equality within continental France was in principle absolute, while in the colonies it was something that had to be cultivated: only if a colonial subject could demonstrate full embodiment in his manners and tastes of the French identity was he to be considered truly equal.