domingo, 19 de outubro de 2014

David Estlund contra a "Utopofobia" na Teoria Política

Na última edição da Philosophy & Public Affairs, David Estlund (Brown) publicou o artigo "Utopophobia" no qual retoma sua reflexão, iniciada em seu livro Democratic Authority, sobre a natureza e os limites de idealizações na teoria política. Para Estlund, posições "realistas" ou "utopofóbicas" tendem a confundir os critérios de verdade sobre algo (ex. justiça, legitimidade, etc.), com os meios mais adequados para sua realização no mundo real. Mais uma contribuição importante para o debate entre "teorias ideais" e "não-ideais".

My thesis is that moral theories of social justice political authority, political legitimacy, and many other moral-political concepts are not shown to have any defect in virtue of the fact, if it is one, that the alleged requirements or preconditions of these things are not likely ever to be met. If a theory of social justice is offered, and it is objected, “But you and I both know people will never do that,” I believe the right response is (as a starter), “I never said they would.”

I focus narrowly on the question of likelihood. This is not because there is a set of authors who explicitly impose a likelihood constraint on theorizing about justice. Rather, there is a heterogeneous antipathy in much traditional and contemporary political philosophy for accounts (of which there are also many) of justice according to which it is nothing we have ever seen or ever expect to see. Recently, this point of view plays a role in the burgeoning literature about the idea of political feasibility, and in the so-called ideal/nonideal theory debate about social justice. I conjecture that a tempting idea underlying some of this antipathy is, roughly, that a sound standard of social justice must be something it would be appropriate to set as a practical social goal. Since the likelihood of success is (as I grant) a criterion of appropriate practical goals, likelihood of achieving justice would emerge, on this view, as a constraint on a sound conception of the content of justice. But then, put the other way around, if I am right that likelihood is no such constraint, then it is a mistake to suppose that a sound standard of justice must be an appropriate practical goal.