Waldron e seu accountability "agressivo"

O filósofo Jeremy Waldron (NYU) disponibilizou na SSRN artigo no qual desenvolve uma proposta "agressiva" de accountability. Agentes políticos em posições de autoridade ou representação devem prestar contas integralmente de seus atos diante dos representados. Eles possuiriam o mesmo dever de expor a contabilidade de suas ações e relações políticas que um agente comercial teria ao ter que informar a natureza de suas transações econômicas. Essa noção seria uma alternativa ao modelo "forense" de responsabilização política no qual autoridades são levadas ao escrutínio legal apenas nos casos de comprovada má conduta pessoal. 

- Waldron: "Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy"

Abstract:      

This paper defends a new and aggressive version of the agency model of accountability. It argues that officials and representatives in a democracy have an obligation to make available to citizens full information about what they have been doing. It is not permissible for them to sit back and see if the citizens can find out for themselves what they have been doing, any more than such a posture would be admissible in a commercial agent such as a realtor or an accountant. The paper also does several other things: (1) it develops a contrast between agent-accountability and forensic-accountability; (2) it distinguishes between political uses of "agency" and political uses of "trust" in political theory; (3) it develops a layered account of the principals in the democratic relation of agent-accountability, rejecting the reidentification of "the people"; (4) it develops an account of the relation between accountability and elections, emphasizing that elections play an important role in the fair settlement among principals as to how they should deal with their agents; (5) it shows that Burkeian representation is not incompatible with agent-accountability; and (6) it uses the notion of agent-accountability to illuminate the distinction between non-democratic and democratic republics.

Seminário: Susan Stokes

Na próxima quinta-feira (29/05) Susan Stokes (Yale) estará na USP para apresentar seu trabalho Social Movements and the Paradox of Repression. A partir das últimas mobilizações populares no Brasil, na Turquia e na Ucrânica, Stokes pretende explicar a lógica da participação política frente à (provável) repressão dos regimes. 

Abstract: 

 Why do people participate in costly collective actions in which their individual participation is unlikely to change the outcome? We introduce the idea of “costly abstention” – that in certain situations abstaining from an action (e.g., joining protests) can be subjectively costly, even when one's taking part will not change the outcome. We argue that a drive to avoid unpleasant psychic tensions associated with abstention from participation lies behind many people’s decisions to join social movements. Our theory puts forward an explanation for the paradox of repression – the observation that many people become more likely to join protests when governments increase repressive measures, presumably to increase the costs of participation. When governments ratchet up repression, some people are more inclined to join protests because observing disproportionate repression generates discomfort in staying at home.  We provide observational and experimental evidence for our theory from recent protest movements in Turkey, Brazil, Ukraine, and Morocco.

Lançamento: Cortes Constitucionais e Democracia Deliberativa

No dia 4 de junho (quarta-feira) o professor Conrado Hübner Mendes (USP)  fará o lançamento do seu livro Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy (Oxford Press) em São Paulo na Livraria Cultura (Conjunto Nacional). No livro, Mendes retoma o problema clássico que cortes supremas e constitucionais colocam para a legitimidade democrática: por que autoridades imunes às regras da maioria deveriam deter tanto poder constitucional? Diferentemente da visão da "imparcialidade" dos juízes, o autor procura ressaltar os ganhos normativos e espistêmicos advindos de processos deliberativos interinstitucionais. 

Livro: O poder da tolerância

Wendy Brown (Berkeley) e Rainer Forst (Goethe) publicaram pela Columbia Press o debate sobre tolerância que promoveram em 2008 na cidade de Berlim. Em The Power of Tolerance os autores discutem as diferentes concepções de tolerância e de que modo o conceito fez parte da história européia. 

O link para o debate pode ser encontrado aqui

Brown & Forst: "The Power of Tolerance: a Debate"

We invoke the ideal of tolerance in response to conflict, but what does it mean to answer conflict with a call for tolerance? Is tolerance a way of resolving conflicts or a means of sustaining them? Does it transform conflicts into productive tensions, or does it perpetuate underlying power relations? To what extent does tolerance hide its involvement with power and act as a form of depoliticization?

Wendy Brown and Rainer Forst debate the uses and misuses of tolerance, an exchange that highlights the fundamental differences in their critical practice despite a number of political similarities. Both scholars address the normative premises, limits, and political implications of various conceptions of tolerance. Brown offers a genealogical critique of contemporary discourses on tolerance in Western liberal societies, focusing on their inherent ties to colonialism and imperialism, and Forst reconstructs an intellectual history of tolerance that attempts to redeem its political virtue in democratic societies. Brown and Forst work from different perspectives and traditions, yet they each remain wary of the subjection and abnegation embodied in toleration discourses, among other issues. The result is a dialogue rich in critical and conceptual reflections on power, justice, discourse, rationality, and identity.

Vita: Teoria Crítica e Justiça Social

Na última edição da Brazilian Political Science Review Álvaro de Vita (USP) resenhou o livro Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice do filósofo uruguaio Gustavo Pereira. Vita avalia a distinção proposta por Pereira entre as teorias críticas da sociedade e o conjunto de teorias pós-rawlsianas da justiça social e a tentativa de sintetizá-las por meio de uma "concepção de justiça social crítica". Ao final, o artigo é uma reflexão rigorosa dos caminhos contemporâneos da teoria política. 

- Vita: "Critical Theory and Social Justice"

Abstract:

In Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice, the Uruguayan political philosopher Gustavo Pereira (2013a) does an admirable job of combining, in an original theoretical formulation, contributions for reflection on the nature of justice in a democratic society, deriving from two distinct traditions of contemporary political philosophy. One tradition is the “Critical Theory” of society, as expressed in writings by the contemporary heirs of the Frankfurt School, especially Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel and Axel Honneth. Let me call the other tradition “post-Rawls theories of justice”. At least for the aims of the present article, this latter broad category can include the theoretical formulations of authors who have significant differences with Rawls, such as G. A. Cohen, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The idea is to propose a “critical theory of justice” or, we might say, a conception of “critical social justice.” The basic elements of this conception are extracted from theoretical perspectives that belong to these two traditions and are then articulated “in a new and systematized fashion, in such a way that the new theory can overcome the shortcomings of the original theories and express a higher commitment to application” (PEREIRA, 2013a, p. 05). The intellectual ambition of this effort can hardly be underestimated. Regardless of how one appraises the success of this project by judging it according to its most ambitious aspirations, the discussion developed by Pereira to specify the “elements” of his conception of critical social justice makes this book highly relevant for students of normative political theory, especially those concerned with social justice issues.

Ateísmo "soft"

O filósofo Gary Gutting (Notre Dame) está conduzindo para o blog The Stone uma série de entrevistas com filósofos, teólogos e cientistas a respeito da natureza e dos rumos da religião no mundo contemporâneo. O entrevistado dessa semana é o filósofo da ciência Philip Kitcher conhecido por suas teses naturalistas e pela defesa de um ateísmo "soft", isto é, uma concepção atéia quanto a verdade das doutrinas religiosas mas tolerante em relação ao valor das tradições religiosas. Alvin Plantinga (Is atheism irrational?) e Jay Garfield (What does buddhism require?) foram outros dos entrevistados por Gutting. 

- The Case for "Soft Atheism" (The Stone)

[...]

G.G.: So you reject all religious doctrines, but you also say that you “resist the claim that religion is noxious rubbish to be buried as deeply, as thoroughly and as quickly as possible.” Why is that?

P.K.: The past decade has seen some trenchant attacks on religion, and I agree with many points made by people like Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins. (Dennett seems to me clearly the most sophisticated of the “new atheists”; much as I admire Dawkins’s work in evolutionary biology and in enhancing the public understanding of science, he is more often off-target in his diatribes against religion.) But these atheists have been rightly criticized for treating all religions as if they were collections of doctrines, to be understood in quite literal ways, and for not attending to episodes in which the world’s religions have sometimes sustained the unfortunate and campaigned for the downtrodden. The “soft atheism” I defend considers religion more extensively, sympathizes with the idea that secularists can learn from religious practices and recommends sometimes making common cause with religious movements for social justice.

G.G.: So on your view, Dawkins and company don’t refute all forms of religion, just unsophisticated literal assertions of religious claims.

P.K.: Yes, I think there’s a version of religion, “refined religion,” that is untouched by the new atheists’ criticisms, and that even survives my argument that religious doctrines are incredible. Refined religion sees the fundamental religious attitude not as belief in a doctrine but as a commitment to promoting the most enduring values. That commitment is typically embedded in social movements — the faithful come together to engage in rites, to explore ideas and ideals with one another and to work cooperatively for ameliorating the conditions of human life. The doctrines they affirm and the rituals they practice are justified insofar as they support and deepen and extend the values to which they are committed. But the doctrines are interpreted nonliterally, seen as apt metaphors or parables for informing our understanding of ourselves and our world and for seeing how we might improve both. To say that God made a covenant with Abraham doesn’t mean that, long ago, some very impressive figure with a white beard negotiated a bargain with a Mesopotamian pastoralist. It is rather to commit yourself to advancing what is most deeply and ultimately valuable, as the story says Abraham did.

Entrevista: Elizabeth Anderson

A filósofa Elizabeth Anderson (Michigan) foi entrevista pelo blog Libertarianism ligado ao Instituto Cato (famoso think tank norte-americano dedicado à causa libertariana). Anderson é famosa por seus trabalhos dedicados à igualdade social e a integração racial nas democracias contemporâneas e também por se opor ao "igualitarismo de fortuna" - uma vertente atual do pensamento igualitário. A pergunta central colocada para Anderson foi: o que é mais importante para promovermos o valor da igualdade, uma igualdade de capacidades ou uma igualdade de resultados? 

- Anderson: "Equality of Capacity or Equality of Outcomes" (entrevista)