sexta-feira, 31 de janeiro de 2014

Aula inaugural: A Lei da Guerra

O professor Rolf Kuntz ministrará a aula inaugural de 2014 do curso de filosofia da USP. O título da aula será "A Lei da Guerra - um tema clássico". O evento ocorrerá dia 18 de fevereiro às 19h.

O cartaz do evento pode ser visto abaixo:

A lei da guerra - um tema clássico
Prof. Rolf Kuntz

Dia 18 de Fevereiro de 2014
às 19h00 - Sala 14
Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 315 - Cidade Universitária - São Paulo


terça-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2014

Sen: Tolerando o Intolerável

O economista Amartya Sen (Harvard) ministrou a conferência Poverty and the Tolerance of the Intolerable este mês na London School of Economics. Sen discorreu sobre os efeitos da pobreza extrema em seu país de origem (Índia, mas valeria para o Brasil) e, principalmente, sobre as estratégias de tipo "culpar a vítima"  típicas em contextos de desigualdade social.

Ouça abaixo o podcast da palestra.



(Amartya Sen na LSE janeiro 2014)

- Sen: "Poverty and the Tolerance of the Intolerable" (podcast)

domingo, 26 de janeiro de 2014

Repensando o aborto na Igreja Católica

O filósofo Gary Gutting no blog The Stone argumenta que a partir da última "exortação aos fieis" escrita pelo papa Francisco (denominada Evangelli Gaudium), e de acordo com a longa tradição racionalista no interior da Igreja Católica, os católicos encontram um fundamento moral contra a proibição "absoluta" do aborto. Afinal, afirma Gutting, se é de fato errado tirar a vida de uma criança tendo como princípio o "valor inviolável de cada vida humana", é possível ao mesmo tempo justificar não apenas a interrupção da gravidez nos primeiros meses em casos de violência sexual (outra violação do princípio) como também interromper gestações nas quais esteja comprovado que existe uma diferença moral importante entre um feto apenas potencialmente humano, e a vida de uma criança.

[...]

There is, then, a strong case for thinking that abortions always bring about some bad results — at a minimum the loss of potential human life — and that for most pregnancies abortion would be morally wrong. But this conclusion is limited in two ways: A woman’s right to control her reproductive life can, as in the case of rape, offset even a person’s right to life; and at least at the earlier stages of pregnancy, the embryo has only the moral standing of potential, not actual, human life, which may be overridden by harm to humans with full moral standing.

These limitations, I suggest, correspond to the “very difficult situations” (such as “rape” and “extreme poverty”) in which the pope, in “Evangelii Gaudium,” admitted the church has “done little to adequately accompany women.” Allowing for exceptions to the moral condemnation of abortion in some of these painful situations would not contradict the pope’s overall commitment to the “value of the human person.” Rather, it would admit what reason shows: There are morally difficult issues about abortion that should be decided by conscience, not legislation. The result would be a church acting according to the pope’s own stated standard: preaching not “certain doctrinal or moral points based on specific ideological options” but rather the gospel of love.

- Gutting: "Should Pope Francis Rethink Abortion?



quinta-feira, 23 de janeiro de 2014

Davos e a disparidade de renda

Segundo o relatório Riscos Globais 2014, a ser apresentado e debatido na edição deste ano do Fórum Econômico Mundial em Davos, a "grave disparidade de renda" caracteriza não apenas o risco societal mais grave para as economias mundiais (na frente de candidatos mais óbvios como "instabilidade política") como representa, dentre os riscos de todas as outras categorias consideradas pelo relatório,  como a maior probabilidade de ocorrência no curto prazo - justamente por já estar acontecendo. O relatório também alerta para as relações sistêmicas entre disparidade, desemprego, crise fiscal e instabilidade política, além de identificar no desemprego dos jovens o principal impacto negativo da desigualdade econômica. 

O fato da disparidade de renda figurar nessa posição de destaque pelo terceiro ano consecutivo deveria alertar as elites econômicas em Davos para os efeitos corrosivos da desigualdade econômica. 

[...]

Macroeconomic risks were strongly linked by respondents to various socio-economic issues. Failure of a financial mechanism or institution, fiscal crises and liquidity crises are risks closely interrelated among themselves and also with the risks of high levels of unemployment and underemployment, income disparity and political and social instability. Recent examples illustrate the reality of these interconnections – the failure of financial institutions brought about a financial crisis that resulted in liquidity crises affecting multiple national economies. This in turn led to higher levels of unemployment, widened income disparity and associated political and social tensions and protests, notably in some European countries and large emerging markets.


  

terça-feira, 21 de janeiro de 2014

Livro: Being Realistic About Reasons

O professor de Harvard T. M. Scanlon lançou seu mais recente livro pela Oxford Press: Being Realistic About Reasons. Nessa obra, Scanlon enfrenta as principais objeções contra o cognitivismo moral, um dos argumentos mais importantes de sua filosofia contratualista. Segundo essa posição, proposições normativas a respeito de nossas ações (é certo fazer x, é errado fazer y, etc.) podem ser consideradas verdadeiras ou falsas objetivamente.  Em outras palavras, temos razões normativas para agir para além de nossos desejos e inclinações subjetivas. Os capítulos do livro foram baseados nas Locke Lectures ministrada por Scanlon em 2009 (o audio das palestras pode ser acessado aqui). É possível falarmos desde de já que a obra será um novo clássico da filosofia moral.

Para quem tiver interesse em entender melhor quais as diferenças entre cognitivismo e anti-cognitivismo morais, existe uma boa entrada na SEP sobre o debate:



Being Realistic About Reasons
by T. M. Scanlon




Description:

T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. 

Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

segunda-feira, 20 de janeiro de 2014

África e o Tribunal Penal Internacional

Kenneth Roth escreveu uma matéria para o The New York Review of Books na qual analisa as recentes críticas feitas por alguns líderes africanos contra o Tribunal Penal Internacional (ICC em inglês). A despeito de contar com uma maioria de Estados africanos como membros colaboradores, apenas africanos foram condenados por genocídio ou crimes contra a humanidade em 11 anos de funcionamento da corte (a lista dos condenados por ser consultada aqui). Mais do que um passo significativo na punição de violações de direitos humanos, alegam os críticos do Tribunal, o dado revela a posição de barganha desfavorecida do continente frente a uma comunidade global que, quando necessário, consegue absolver seus criminosos por meio de manobras políticas. Legítima ou não, a crítica nos leva aos limites dos mecanismos atuais de justiça global. 

[...]

That war criminals still run free where the court cannot act is hardly reason to refrain from prosecution where it can. Yet on a continent whose people have suffered under colonialism, the charge that they are subject to an international standard of justice that no one else actively faces—not in Afghanistan or Iraq, not in Sri Lanka or Israel—resonates among African leaders and some of their constituents. And while most European governments have accepted the court’s jurisdiction, it doesn’t help that some of the world’s most powerful nations—the United States, China, Russia, and India, to name a few—have not.


Kenneth Roth/NY Review

What are we to make of the fact that in its eleven-year history, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has prosecuted only Africans? Should the court be condemned for discrimination—for taking advantage of Africa’s weak global position—as some African leaders contend? Or should it be applauded for giving long-overdue attention to atrocities in Africa—a sign that finally someone is concerned about the countless ignored African victims, as many African activists contend? This debate is at the heart of one of the most serious challenges the ICC has ever faced. If the current attack on it succeeds, the court’s future may be in doubt.
The ICC was founded in 2002, under a treaty negotiated at a global conference in Rome, as an independent judicial body that would challenge impunity for the gravest international crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Unlike the International Court of Justice, which is also based in The Hague but settles legal disputes between states, the International Criminal Court addresses mass atrocities committed by individuals. To avoid prosecution, ruthless national leaders too often threaten, corrupt, or compromise judges and prosecutors at home, but those in The Hague should be beyond the reach of such obstructionism. The ICC is meant as a court of last resort for victims and survivors who cannot find justice in their own country and as a deterrent to leaders who have little to fear from domestic prosecution. The court has now been accepted by 122 states. The United States has not joined it out of fear that Americans might be prosecuted.
The issue of the ICC’s focus on Africa has gained prominence as it proceeds against its most powerful suspect so far, President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. He is accused of directing some of the violence that shook his country in late 2007 and early 2008 following vigorously contested elections. An estimated 1,100 people were killed and as many as 650,000 were forced to flee their homes.

Kenyatta has appeared in The Hague voluntarily and has mounted a vigorous defense. But he has also used his position as head of state to turn every available weapon against the court in an effort to avoid prosecution. The Kenyan government has solicited demands from the African Union that he not be required to appear at trial. It has asked the United Nations Security Council to delay the case. It has pleaded with the governments that are members of the ICC to change the rules, and it has sent diplomats around Africa with the apparent aim of orchestrating a mass withdrawal from the court. None of these efforts so far has stopped the case from proceeding.
The ICC is hardly an institution that looks anti-African. Its largest block of members—34 of its 122 states—is from Africa, and they were central in negotiating the Rome treaty that established the court. Those thirty-four states—including Kenya—represent a solid majority of Africa’s fifty-four nations. The ICC’s chief prosecutor is an African—Fatou Bensouda of Gambia. She assumed the post in 2012 after having served for eight years as the deputy prosecutor. Africans serve among the court’s judges and the prosecutor’s staff.

sexta-feira, 17 de janeiro de 2014

50 anos do Golpe de 1964

A FFLCH (USP) montou uma programação no primeiro semestre de 2014 para relembrar os eventos que levaram ao golpe de Estado no Brasil 50 anos atrás. O evento é multidisciplinar e entre as mesas redondas serão discutidos temas como o populismo, a onda autoritária na América Latina e o impacto da ditadura nas letras brasileiras. 

Abaixo, o programa completo do evento.