sexta-feira, 30 de agosto de 2013

Michael Huemer: O problema da autoridade política

Seria moralmente justificada a "autoridade política" dos Estados?  Sabemos que parte constitutiva de sua legitimidade é fundada na coerção e no controle... Grande parte da teoria política contemporânea aceita sem problemas que Estados possuem tal poder moral sobre a vida de seus cidadãos - pelo simples fato de garantirem as condições para a vida em sociedade. Michael Huemer (Colorado) em seu livro "The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination on the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey" questiona os pressupostos centrais dessa tese de um ponto de vista libertariano. Alguns dos argumentos de Huemer encontram-se em um ensaio apresentado no Instituto Cato

- Huemer: "The Problem of Authority" [Cato Unbound]

- Huemer: "The Problem of Political Authority [Chap. 1]"


The Problem of Political Authority


The Problem of Political Authority | Michael Huemer


Abstract

A foundational assumption of political philosophy is that some governments possess a moral property known as political authority. Theories of authority are meant to explain, first, why individuals are ethically obligated to obey the law under normal circumstances, and second, why agents of the state are normally ethically entitled to coerce individuals to obey.

In the first part of the book, I consider several philosophical accounts that have been offered for why some states possess this peculiar moral status. I argue that none of these accounts succeed, and thus that no person or group genuinely possesses political authority. I go on to consider the psychology of authority, arguing that a series of non-rational factors explain traditional beliefs and attitudes about authority. Finally, I consider the implications for individual and governmental behavior of relinquishing the belief in authority.

In the second part of the book, I confront a central assumption of most theories of authority: that a central authority structure is essential to any livable society. Against this assumption, I argue that a livable society could exist with no recognized central authority.