Novo artigo na SSRN publicado pelos cientistas políticos Nicolai Marinov (Yale) e Hein Goemans (Rochester) analisa a relação entre "coups d'etat" e eleições competitivas a partir dos anos 90. O resultado (alegado pelos autores como surpreendente) é o de que a vasta maioria dos golpes foi seguida por eleições competitivas (possibilidades reais de alternância de poder)
We use new data on coup d’états and elections to document a striking development: whereas the vast majority of successful coups before 1991 installed durable rules, the majority of coups after that have been followed by competitive elections. We argue that after the Cold War international pressure influenced the consequences of coups. In the post-Cold War era those countries that are most dependent on Western aid have been the first to embrace competitive elections after the coup. Our theory also sheds light on the pronounced decline in the number of coups since 1991. While the coup d’état has been and still is the single most important factor leading to the downfall of democratic government, our findings indicate that the new generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical predecessors.